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Introduction: Overall Argument
In  this  paper,  we  explore  C. S. Peirce’s  pragmatic  conception  of  sign  action  as  a
temporally distributed and emergent process.1 We illustrate our argument through the
emergence  of  classical  ballet  as  a  semiotic  process.  Pragmatism  was  originally
formulated by Peirce as a theory of meaning,  a methodological  principle or rule to
clarify ideas, concepts and propositions (Hookway 2002; Legg & Hookway 2019). This
principle states that the meaning of a sign implies likely events to occur in a course of
experience, according to a set of antecedent conditions (CP 5.468). In this formulation,
meaning is an open ended process, constrained by likelihoods, but open to novelty. The
meaning of a sign is not a given content nor an essential form, but emerges as a habit of
sign action. 
Semiosis emerges (see Queiroz & El-Hani 2006a,b). The emergence of a sign in action is
the  emergence  of  an  autonomous,  or  self-organized,  habit.  Self-organization  is  a
process that leads a complex system towards dynamically stable states of increased
redundancy  and  reduced  variability.  In  our  description,  stability  is  not  absence  of
change  (stasis),  but  regularity  through  change  (Kelso  1995).  Peirce’s  theory  is
compatible  with  the  notion  of  self-organization,  especially  when  we  consider  how
semiotic habits stabilize communication within a system (a community) of utterers and
interpreters,  through  self-correcting  dynamics  and  circular  relations  within  that
community (Loula & Queiroz 2011). New habits of sign action emerge from previously
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existing sign action in a  cultural  evolutionary process.  Out of  semiosis  that  follows
some stability and tendency of development, new habits become stabilized and begin to
develop  autonomously.  In  our  description,  this  corresponds  to  the  emergence  of  a
distributed cognitive system of agents and artifacts which both enacts this habit and is
regulated by it (Atã & Queiroz, in press). An example is the historical emergence of
classical ballet. Classical ballet is a habit of sign action: a codification of dance steps
that  disciplines  bodies  and  stabilizes  their  communicative  behavior  within  a
community of utterers and interpreters. The historical emergence of classical ballet is a
self-regulatory  process,  in  which  a system  of  different  kinds  of  cognitive  artifacts
(musical,  bodily/motor,  visual,  spatial/architectonic)  and  agents  obtained  a  stable
semiotic  relation  throughout  many  phases  of  development  between  the  16th  and
19th Century. This is not only emergence of actual meaning, but also, emergence of an
open-ended  niche  of  potential  and  general  meaning  processes,  an  autonomous
tendency of development or a pragmatic likelihood of occurrences. 
 
Meaning and Habit
Peirce  is  the  founder  of  modern  semiotics,  the  doctrine  of  the  essential  and
fundamental nature of all varieties of possible meaning processes [i.e., semiosis, or sign
action]  (CP  5.484).  Semiotics  describes  and  analyzes  the  structure  of  sign  action
independently of their material bases, or of the conditions under which they can be
observed:  inside  cells  (cytosemiosis),  among tissues  and cell  populations,  in  animal
communication (zoosemiosis), or in typically human activities (production of notations,
metarepresentations,  etc.).  In other words,  Peirce’s  concept of  semiotics concerns a
theory of signs in its most general sense (Fisch 1986: 321). Peirce conceived general
semiotics much like a formal science as mathematics is (CP 2.227). However, semiotics
finds the objects of its investigation in the sign’s concrete, natural environment and in
“normal human experience” (CP 1.241). In our example, the object of investigation is
the emergence of classical ballet.
An  approach  to  meaning  that  focuses  on  the  action  of  signs  can  be  contrasted  to
approaches that focus either primarily on the sign itself (formalist and structuralist
approaches) or on the sign-user (psychological, neurocognitive, anthropological and
sociological approaches).  Semiosis is a concept that describes the most fundamental
relations involved in processes of meaning and cognition, as opposed to reactive, brute-
force processes (EP 2:646). The difference between semiotic and non-semiotic processes
is that non-semiotic processes can be decomposed into dyadic or reactive processes,
while semiotic processes are irreducibly triadic (Houser 1997: 16; Burch 1997; Brunning
1997). Any description of semiosis should necessarily treat it as a relation constituted
by three irreducibly connected terms – sign, object, interpretant (S-O-I, in short), which
are its minimal constitutive elements (CP 5.484, EP 2:171).
[…]  by  “semiosis” I  mean  […]  an  action,  or  influence,  which  is,  or  involves,  a
cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-
relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. (CP
5.484)
Triadic  irreducibility  is  a  requirement  of  any  process  that  we  might  regard  as
“cognitive,” “representational,” or related to “meaning” – “A sign, or representamen, is
something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (CP
2.228). The expression stand for is metaphorical. This “standing for” relation involves a
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constraining or regulation of S (sign) by O (object) (S is understood in relation to O)
(Atkin 2016). I (interpretant) in S-O-I is an effect produced in a cognitive system by the
use  of  S  as  constrained  by  O.  Semiosis  is  an  irreducible  process  through  which  a
constraining factor (O) acts on interpretative behavior (I) because of the mediation of a
certain entity (or group of entities) or process (S).
It is important to stress that there are no intrinsic attributes defining the ontology or
the  spatiotemporal  existence  of  S,  O,  or  I.  They  are  not  necessarily  phenomenal
contents,  intentional  contents,  mental  representations,  concepts,  thoughts,  etc.  The
role of S can be identified only in the mediative relation that it establishes between O
and I.  Similarly,  the role of  O is  identified in the relation by which it  determines I
through the mediation of S. And, finally, the role of I is identified by the fact that it is
determined by O through S. Therefore, if we consider only dyadic relations, S-I, S-O, or
I-O, or the elements in isolation, we cannot deduce how they would behave in a triadic
relation, S-O-I (EP 2:391). Irreducibility of semiosis should be understood in terms of
the non-deducibility of the behavior of the logical-functional elements of a triad on the
grounds of their behavior in simpler relations.
Peirce also defined a sign as a medium for the communication to the interpretant of a
“form”  embodied  in  the  object,  so  as  to  constrain  or  regulate,  in  general,  the
interpreter’s behavior (MS 793:1-3, EP 2.544, n.22). Form is defined as having the “being
of  predicate”  (EP  2.544)  and  it  is  also  pragmatically  formulated  as  a  “conditional
proposition” stating that certain things would happen under specific circumstances (EP
2.388). For Peirce, form is nothing like a “thing” (De Tienne, 2003), but something that
is  embodied in the object  (EP 2.544,  n.  22)  as  a  habit,  a  “rule  of  action” (CP 5.397,
CP 2.643), a “disposition” (CP 5.495, CP 2.170), a “real potential” (EP 2.388) or, simply, a
“permanence of some relation” (CP 1.415).  Form can also be defined as potentiality
(“real potential,” EP 2.388). According to Flower and Murphey, there is a transition in
Peirce’s semiotics from the notion of meaning as a qualitative conception carried by a
sign to a relational notion according to which the meaning of a concept consists in a
“law relating operations performed upon the object or conditions of perceptions to
perceived effects” (Flower & Murphey 1977: 589). The qualitative conception involves
reference to the sign’s ground, while the “law” or necessary conditions of perception
are relational rather than qualitative – “If the meaning of a concept of an object is to
consist in the conditionals relating operations on the object to perceived effects, these
conditionals will in fact be habits” (Flower & Murphey 1977: 590). 
The notion of habit occupies a central position in Peirce’s pragmatism (Hookway 1985;
West & Anderson 2016; Atã & Queiroz 2016). Habit entails a disposition to act in certain
ways  under  certain  circumstances,  especially  when  the  carrier  of  the  habit  is
stimulated,  animated,  or  guided  by  certain  motives  (CP  5.480).  The  meaning  of  a
Peircean sign is most adequately understood through the habits of action they provoke,
sustain, and modify. When somebody says a diamond is “hard,” that person means that
a diamond’s nature includes the ability to cut glass and other substances. That person’s
disposition  to  conceive  of  a  diamond  in  this  way  –  rather  than  conceiving  it  for
ornamental purposes – constitutes, pragmatically, what “hardness” means, and
“diamond” means in terms of its characteristics and its nature. If that person had once
considered  diamonds  strictly  in  terms  of  rare  gems  and  ornamentation,  then  the
characteristics  and nature of  diamonds were previously something other than they
now are. Consequently, the meaning of “diamond” changed when a diamond became a
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means for qualifying “hardness.” This is  to say that the notion of semiosis as form
communicated from O to I through mediation of S allows us to conceive of semiosis,
and  meaning  and  meaning  change,  in  a  non-substantive,  processual  way,  as  a
constraining factor  of  possible  patterns  of  interpretive  behavior  through habit  and
change of habit (Queiroz & El-Hani 2006a).
Let’s consider our main example. Classical ballet is a semiotic process endowed with
meaning. Any ballet performance is an instantiated sign, composed of several signs,
and which determines interpretive effects according to some regularity. In any ballet
performance, a sign acts according to a regular habit that connects sign (performance),
object (in a most general description, the “form” of ballet itself  that regulates how
signs behave), and interpretants (interpretive effects, for example on the audience).
From the 16th to the 19th century, the ballet sign has taken several habits that regulate
sign action,  such as  the codification of  a  vocabulary of  dance steps  with a  specific
nomenclature and notation,  the establishment of  the proscenium arch stage as  the
preferred technology regulating performance space,  the  standardization of  training
techniques and consequent relative regularization of the skills, bodies, and abilities of
professional dancers, etc. All of these are cases in which variability has been decreased
and redundancy increased, so that sign action becomes more regular. They all are part
of what makes classical ballet a sign in action, endowed with a potential to further
produce interpretants.
 
Semiosis is Temporally Distributed
Semiosis is part of an always ongoing process of communication, a “chain of triads”
(see figure 1). S-O-I is the focal-factor of a dynamical process (Hausman 1993: 72). A sign
in a given S-O-I triad will lead to the production of an interpretant, which, in turn, is a
new sign in relation to the object of S. That is, an interpretant is both the third term of
a previous triad and the first term (sign) of a subsequent triad (Savan 1988) (figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The triadic relation S-O-I forming a chain of triads. 
Semiosis is a dynamic process, with signs continuously translating into other signs, in
time. The mode of existence of a sign is to produce interpretative effects which are new
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signs.  A  single  person  thinking  to  herself  already  embodies  a  dynamic  process  of
semiosis. This temporal distribution of semiosis is a central aspect of Peirce’s semiotics:
To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is
but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or
that all thought is in signs. (CP 5.253)
Semiosis is temporally distributed, a time-dependent action of signs which develops in
several  historical  and  evolutionary  scales.  To  describe  a  habit  of  sign  action  is  to
describe a dynamic process involving past and future: a relation, developing in time,
between a cumulative generalization of a past history of sign actions and a likelihood
that this history will somehow regulate future sign actions. In this framework, stability
of semiosis in time is not understood as an instantiation of representational states in a
system but  as  regularity  of  sign action throughout communication.  A habit  doesn’t
entail stasis, but regularity throughout change.
Classical ballet entails semiotic chains in several different time scales. An instantiated
sign of ballet, such as a ballet performance, has the power of generating new signs: a
ballet performance generates interpretative effects in an audience, which develop into
a critic literature about that performance, which in turn generates more interpretive
effects, and so forth, constituting traditions of critique and discourse as sequences of
reinterpretations and retranslations of ballet signs. Ballet performances also generate
all  sorts  of  artworks  in  different  media  (including  other  ballet  performances)  that
dialogue  with  it  by  making  reference,  reinterpreting  themes,  taking  inspiration,
reacting aesthetically, and so on. But we don’t need to consider only instantiated ballet
performances as examples of how ballet entails semiotic chains. The body of the ballet
dancer is a sign, being reinterpreted and translated throughout the history of ballet.
The baroque courtier dancer of the 17th century is a sign endowed with a potential to
generate interpretants. It gets translated into the professional academic dancers, the
dancers of different ballet schools, all the way to modern and contemporary dancers.
What connects all of these dancing bodies is a temporally distributed semiotic process,
a semiotic chain that communicates some balletic forms so as to generate new ballet
signs. 
This process also entails an interplay between redundancy and novelty, a negotiation of
the stability of semiotic habits. One of the most stable habits of classical ballet is the
codification of the so-called five basic positions of the body (or, more precisely, the
feet). The first position is a “gathering point” or resting position for the dancer (heels
meeting at a central point and toes pointing outward), while the other four positions
prepare the dancer to move (Homans 2010: 23) (see figure 2). Codified in the late 17th
century by Pierre Beauchamp, the dancing master of Louis XIV, the five positions are
the foundations of classical ballet:
The importance of these positions cannot be overstated: they are the major scale,
the primary colors from which all other constructions in ballet arise. Without them,
la belle danse was a social dance; with them, the crucial leap from etiquette to art
was made. (Ibid.: 23)
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Figure 2: Five basic positions of the body
Between  16th  and  19th  century,  dance  changed  radically:  baroque  dance  became
classical  ballet,  the nobles and courtiers were replaced by professional dancers,  the
palace halls and gardens were replaced by theaters with proscenium arch stages, the
male predominance on stage was overcome by the central figure of the ballerina, and
yet  the  five  positions  changed  very  little  in  comparison.  To  this  day,  they  remain
structurally the same, with the main transformation being a widening of the angle at
which the feet point outward from the body (originally, the feet were never supposed
to point outwards at an angle wider than 45 degrees).
However, this semiotic stability is not the same as propagation of a representational
state or of informational content. The five positions of the feet discipline the dancer’s
movement so as to constrain the interpretative effects  that the dance performance
entails. Originally, this codification was carried out with the objective of making the
dancer  appear  noble,  as  opposed  to  lesser  social  characters  that  were  depicted  as
having the feet pointing inwards (ibid.: 23). But as ballet became more detached from
etiquette,  this distinction between the noble body and the body of the lower social
classes became less pragmatically relevant for the action of the sign. In our description,
the five positions of the body cannot be said to be a representational state or to convey
an informational content.  Its stability has the form of a habit of action, with open-
ended results, across very distinct contexts and communicative situations. The semiotic
character of the five positions of the feet is historical, temporally distributed: it is not
synchronically located, and its object is a mere form that requires time and context to
be expressed as a regularity.
This  dynamic  semiotic  frame  needs  to  be  understood  together  with  Peirce’s
pragmatism. The mode of being of signs is to act – determine effects – in the world.
Semiosis  is  a  process  in  which  action  and  communication  are  co-dependent.  This
entails a semiotic kind of cognitive externalism: just as for Peirce it is impossible to
think without signs, so also cognition itself is impossible without external, materially-
incorporated action and its consequences.  Minds are not severed from the external
world, but are continuous to it.2 To think with signs is to think with external artifacts
and within a community. 
This view of the temporal distribution of meaning has consequences for the notion of
distributed cognitive systems (Zhang & Patel 2006; Hutchins 2014; Davies & Michaelian
2016), as it entails a “semiotization” of the discussion about distribution of cognition
(see Atã and Queiroz, in press). Hutchins (2014) has characterized distributed cognition
as an emergentist  approach to cognition.  In our approach, semiosis is  a temporally
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distributed  process  in  which  a  regular  tendency  towards  certain  future  outcomes
emerges  out  of  a  history  of  sign  actions  (a  semiotic  chain).  Our  approach  here  is
pragmatic and action-oriented (cf. Engel, Friston & Kragic 2016; Madzia & Jung 2016),
and focuses on sign action, as conceived by Peirce’s pragmatism. According to the kind
of  cognitive  externalism afforded by a  Peircean perspective,  whenever  we consider
distributed cognitive systems (DCS), we have to consider that the agents and artifacts in
question embody irreducible semiotic processes. What makes some entity a part of a
DCS is that, in the context of that system, the entity acts as a first term that triadically
stands for a second term in order to determine a third term, which is a regular effect.
In other words, what makes an entity a part of a DCS is that it acts as a sign so as to
generate other signs. Why is it crucial to consider semiosis when describing DCSs? We
cannot explain (it is not sufficient) the meaningful behavior of DCSs as the effects of
explanatory units such as persons, groups of persons, or artifacts. The phenomenon to
be described and explained when examining a DCS is the action of signs. Agents and
artefacts in a DCS are observed as processes of irreducible triadic relations. DCSs and
their meaningful behavior are outcomes of the action of signs. The fundamental unit of
explanation  for  the  behavior  of  persons  and  artefacts  in  a  DCS  are  the  signs  that
regulate them. The concept of semiosis is not a re-description of individual actions of
agents and artifacts. In fact, the object of description here is not agents, artifacts, and
their  doings,  but  some  real  general  process  that  supervenes  on  them  but  is  not
reducible to their particular properties. In this view, whenever one refers to an agent
or a cognitive artifact in a DCS, he/she is referring to signs, and describing semiosis. In
this active semiotic externalism, cognition is the development of available cognitive
artifacts in which it is embodied as a power to produce interpretants (interpretative/
communicative effects).
Consider ballet: It is a habit of sign action, a codification of dance steps that disciplines
bodies and stabilize their communicative behavior within a community of utterers and
interpreters. This habit is temporally distributed. In the case of ballet, the agents of the
DCS  are  dancers,  audiences,  choreographers,  producers,  theorists,  critics,  etc.,  that
integrate a community within which “ballet” is  a  sign endowed with meaning.  The
artifacts  of  the  DCS  integrate  an  extensive  list  of  items  with  which  this  large
community enact the sign “ballet” as a process of meaning: dance notation systems,
markings,  musical  notations  and  instruments,  stage  architecture  and  stage
technologies, illumination devices, wearables, props and prostheses, literary artifacts
such as narrative structures and character archetypes, print media such newspapers,
magazines, books, etc. This extensive distributed cognitive system develops in time,
from 16th century court dance to 20th century classical ballet. Throughout this time,
agents and artifacts come and go, but the distributed system continues as a dynamical
regularity throughout radically different circumstances and situations. This dynamical
regularity evolves, changing its conditions of stability in several critical moments. This
evolution takes the form of development of cognitive artifacts. 
 
Emergence of Semiosis
Emergentism is a naturalistic and physicalistic (physical monist) position, according to
which the evolution of physically constituted systems show critical turning points in
which new organizational patterns arise, and, thus, new classes of systems exhibiting
novel properties and processes. Emergentism assumes a hierarchy of levels of existence,
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and the  distinction  between  non-systemic  and  systemic  properties  (i.e.,  properties
observed at  the level  of  the whole,  but  not  of  the parts).  The thesis  of  synchronic
determination – a corollary of physical monism – states that a system’s properties and
behavioral  dispositions depend on its  microstructure:  there can be no difference in
systemic  properties  without  there  being  some  difference  in  the  properties  of the
system’s parts and/or in their arrangement. In turn, diachronic determination states
that  the coming into existence of  new structures  would be  a  deterministic  process
governed by natural  laws (Stephan 1999:  31).  This  latter  feature  of  emergentism is
incompatible  with  Peirce’s  theoretical  framework,  as  he  rejected  the  belief  in  a
deterministic  universe (CP 6.201).  However,  this does not preclude the treatment of
emergence in connection to a Peircean account of semiosis, as there are also emergence
theories committed to indeterminism (e.g., Popper in Popper & Eccles 1986 [1977]). 
Semiosis  is  an  emergent  self-organizing  process  in  a  complex  system of  sign users
interacting locally and mutually affecting each other (Loula et al., 2010). Queiroz and El-
Hani (2012, 2006a,b) have modelled semiosis as an emergent, multi-level, process. Their
model  is  based  on  Stanley  Salthe’s  (1985;  1993)  hierarchical  structuralist  model  of
emergence, combining it explicitly with Peirce’s triadic system of categories. Interested
in Peirce’s philosophy (Salthe, 1993: xi), Salthe has developed a multi-level hierarchical
approach consisting of a “basic triadic system.” We are going to describe below Peirce’s
triadic system of categories, and the model of semiotic emergence based on Salthe’s
basic triadic system.
The Peircean list of categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) can be described as a
system  of  classes  of  irreducible  logical,  phenomenological  and  metaphysical
components (see Houser 1997; Brunning 1997). In brief, the categories can be defined as
follows:  (1)  Firstness:  what  is  such  as  it  is,  without  reference  to  anything  else;  (2)
Secondness: what is such as it is, in relation with something else, but without relation
with any third entity; (3) Thirdness: what is such as it is,  insofar as it is capable of
bringing a second entity into relation with a first one in the same way that it brings
itself into relation with the first and the second entities. This system is the foundation
of Peirce’s philosophy and, also, of his model of semiosis (see Murphey 1993: 303-6).
Firstness as a mode of being is a mere possibility. It can be characterized as lacking
determination (cf. MS 277), and it is the category of vagueness and novelty. Secondness
as a mode of being is an actual occurrence (Parker 1998; CP 6.455). It is the category of
dyadic relations (CP 8.330) and reactions (CP 6.200). The actuality of a thing is simply its
occurrence or  the realization of  a  possibility,  without  thereby making reference to
something larger, be that a general law or an interpretation. Thirdness is the category
of mediation, habit, generality, and conceptualization (CP 1.340).
Queiroz and El-Hani’s  (2012,  2006,a,b) model of semiosis as an emergent multi-level
phenomenon assumes that a description of semiosis need to consider at least three
distinct levels of description: a focal level, a micro-semiotic level, and a macro-semiotic
level.  These levels  are based on Salthe’s  hierarchical  structuralist  system. The focal
level, in Salthe’s model, is the level of observation of an actual phenomenon. This level
is  comparable  to  the  Peircean logical  phenomenological  category  of  secondness,  the
consideration of actuality of  occurrence.  At this level  we observe instantiated signs
effectively acting and producing new instantiated signs. This dynamic action of signs
has been modelled by Peirce as a chain of semiotic triads (see figure 1 above). This
effective  sign  action  is  emergent,  which  in  our  approach  means  that  it  cannot  be
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logically  inferred  from  the  behavior  of  parts  of  a  system  considered  in  simpler
relations.
The micro-semiotic level is a lower level of description, that considers the components
of the focal phenomenon. These components could be related in many possible ways,
and the actual semiosis observed at the focal level is but one among many ways the
phenomenon could have been instantiated. This level is comparable to the Peircean
logical phenomenological category of firstness the consideration of elements of situated
experience  regardless  of  any  actual  connection  or  determination.  At  this  level  of
description we can only regard the elements in their positive characters and situated
possibilities of action, how they could act, but not how they will or would act. Here we
observe  not  an  actual  semiotic  chain,  but  only  possible  signs  determining  possible
interpretants in relation to possible objects. In the domain of Firstness, we find a set of
potential causal relations at the lower level, which can constitute a particular set of
processes at the focal level. The examination of a micro-semiotic level of description
establishes initiating conditions, or potentialities of action, but how a sign will act is
indeterminable by this level alone. Hence, besides considering the micro-semiotic level
of description we need also to consider a macro-semiotic level.
The emergence of effective sign action at the focal level is the result of an irreducible
interplay of initiating and boundary conditions. An upward (micro to focal) constitutive
determination on what will emerge can be described in the form of a potentiality of
sign action provided by the components of a semiotic triad: potential signs, potential
objects, potential interpretants. A downward (macro to focal) selective determination
on what will emerge can be described in the form of a tendency of sign action given by
a  temporal  or  historical  context.  The  irreducible  interplay  of  these  upward  and
downward  determinative  relations  result  in  the  emergence  of  effective  sign  action
observed in the focal level (see figures 3 and 4).
The  macro-semiotic  level  is  a  higher  level  of  description,  that  considers  an
environment or context in which the focal phenomenon is framed or niched. This level
is  comparable  to  the  Peircean  logical  phenomenological  category  of  thirdness,  the
consideration  of  elements  of  situated  experience  as  they  are  mediated  by  habits
(general  tendencies,  regularities  or  law-like  behaviors).  In  our  description,  this
contextual level is a temporal context, and the habit is temporally distributed in the
form of a cumulative and generalizable history of past sign action that tends towards
some futures rather than others. This tendency plays the selective role of boundary
conditions,  that  limit  or  constrain  potentialities  of  action  in  terms  of  historical
tendencies.  At  this  level  we  describe  a  history  of  interconnected  semiotic  chains
forming a past semiotic web or network that embeds habits of sign action. But the
examination of a macro level of description doesn’t allow us to infer how these habits
will be instantiated. In order to do that, we have to consider the interaction between
micro-semiotic and macro-semiotic level. 
The emergence of effective sign action at the focal level is the result of an irreducible
interplay of initiating and boundary conditions. An upward (micro to focal) constitutive
determination on what will emerge can be described in the form of a potentiality of
sign action provided by the components of a semiotic triad: potential signs, potential
objects, potential interpretants. A downward (macro to focal) selective determination
on what will emerge can be described in the form of a tendency of sign action given by
a  temporal  or  historical  context.  The  irreducible  interplay  of  these  upward  and
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downward  determinative  relations  result  in  the  emergence  of  effective  sign  action
observed in the focal level (see figures 3 and 4). The process which will emerge at the




Figure 3: A scheme of the determinative relationships in Salthe’s hierarchical system in relation to
Peirce’s categories. Initiating conditions (associated with Peirce’s category of firstness) and
boundary conditions (associated with Peirce’s category of thirdness) act together and irreducibly,
determining an upward potentiality of action and a downward selective determination on the
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Figure 4: Micro-semiotic, macro-semiotic, and focal level of observations. At the focal level we
observe effective dynamic sign action, that can be modelled as semiotic chains. At the micro-
semiotic level we observe possible sign action (represented by the dotted lines between possible
semiotic triads). At the macro-semiotic level we observe networks of semiotic chains regulated by
habits. The interaction between the micro-semiotic and the macro-semiotic level lead to the
emergence of actual semiosis at the focal level.
An  important  assumption  of  this  model  is  the  ubiquity  of  semiotic  emergence.  In
semiotic  systems,  every  sign  action  is  emergent.  This  is  compatible  with  Peirce’s
distinction  between  dyadic  brute  force  interactions  on  the  one  hand  and  triadic
(mediated), semiotic, interactions on the other. Dyadic interactions can be analyzed in
terms of dyadic relations: facts or logical relations of two terms. An example is the
dyadic notion of reference. We may try to explain the vertical morphology of dance
movements  of  the  romantic  ballerina  as  a  reference  to  an  ethereal  being  (say,  a
sylphide)  because  both  the  ethereal  being  and  the  dance  movements  share  some
qualities  (lightness,  verticality).  This  would be akin to  seeing the ballerina and the
sylphide as aggregate terms, correlated by a predicate (see CP 3.535). Dyadic relations
allow  us  to  describe  systems  that  are  reducible  to  aggregations  of  pairs  of  terms.
However, such a description of reference in terms of a shared predicate says nothing
about the higher level of the system itself, but only describes properties of aggregate
terms.  This  kind  of  description  is  insufficient  to  account  for  semiotic  relations.  As
previously described, semiotic relations are irreducibly triadic. To consider semiotic
relations we have to increase the “order of relativity” (CP 3.625): from the mere dyadic
correlation between terms, to a triadic relation in which a relation between two terms
form a third correlate term, which is a whole (CP 7.537). A semiotic relation is not a fact
about  two  terms,  but  instead  a  triple  fact:  what  makes  the  relation  between the
romantic  ballerina  and  the  sylphide  a  semiotic  relation  is  not  the  mere  logical
possibility that the ballerina and the sylphide share some qualities, but the power that
this logical possibility acquires, within the context of a semiotic chain, of producing
interpretants.  In  order  to  describe  this  triadic  relation,  we  have  to  take  into
consideration not only the qualities of the elements, but a process that happens in the
level of interpretative system itself. In other words, if a romantic ballerina is regarded
as  standing  for  a  sylphide,  we  cannot  explain  this  relation  by  considering  only  a
predicate of the ballerina and of the sylphide; we have to consider the ballerina, the
sylphide and the mediative action of ballet itself as a triple fact that is irreducible to a
dyadic relation. It is in this sense that we can say that every sign action is emergent,
and that this ubiquity of emergence is compatible to Peirce’s description of semiosis as
irreducibly triadic (and not dyadic). A consequence of this view is that semiotic chains
and networks are constantly subjected to potential emergence of novelty: an aggregate
pair of terms doesn’t necessarily produce some interpretant. The stability of semiosis in
time is not conceived as absence of novelty, but as regularity obtained across novelty.
Another important assumption of the model is the self-organization of semiotic chains
and networks. Semiotic networks at the macro-semiotic level are constituted by past
semiotic  chains  at  the  focal  level,  and  in  turn,  help  to  further  determine  it.  A
consequence  of  self-organization  of  semiosis  is  that  sign  action  is  always  to  some
degree self-referential: ballet signs instantiate ballet objects, ballet properties, ballet
experiments, etc., that are considered pragmatically relevant in a certain context of
practice that has itself been constructed by these objects, properties, experiments. This
view is in opposition to the understanding of signs as conveyors of referential content.
It is simplistic to attempt to characterize the semiotic process of ballet as dependent on
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some referential object independent of the semiotic process itself, because the whole
complex is  irreducibly  dependent  and  self-constructed. The  pragmatically  relevant
communication of self-referential properties of ballet renews or reiterates the capacity
of  this  sign  or  system of  signs  (ballet)  of  semiotically  structuring  some contextual
reality, or of conferring some useful agency to utterers and interpreters in relation to a
given contextual reality. In this sense, whenever we talk about dancers, audience, or
any cognitive artifacts involved in the action of the ballet sign, we consider them as
signs whose action is emergent and integrate a self-constructed semiotic process.
 
Emergence of Classical Ballet as a Sign in Action
Classical ballet is an emergent sign in action. This sign in action is distributed in time
(across  the  whole  history  of  ballet),  and  defined  as  an  open-ended  tendency  of
development  and  pragmatic  likelihood  of  occurrences  of  meaning  processes.  The
emergence of classical ballet is the emergence of a habitual, self-organized, temporally
distributed semiotic process. It involves several historical episodes, such as the leap
from etiquette to art form with the codification of body positions during the reign of
Louis XIV,  the  transfer  of  dance  performances  from  court  venues  to  theaters  with
proscenium  arch  stages,  the  professionalization  of  dance  and  the  formation  of
professional dancers, the formation and development of a popular audience for ballet,
several episodes of embodied research and stabilization of dance techniques (e.g., the
emergence of the pointe technique, popularized by Marie Taglioni in the 1830’s), several
episodes of systematization and codification of dance vocabularies (e.g.,  such as the
alphabet of dance steps published in Carlo Blasis’ 1828 The Code of Terpsichore). At any of
these episodes, the development of the semiotic chain is subjected to upward initiating
conditions  from a  micro-semiotic  level  and downward boundary  conditions  from a
macro-semiotic level. 
A particular example that can illustrate the role of micro-semiotic and macro-semiotic
levels concerns the proscenium arch stage. At a micro-semiotic level, the development
of the semiotic chain of classical ballet is regulated by the availability of artifacts and
the initiating conditions for sign action they embody. Consider the performance space
of ballet. In its baroque origins in European courts, ballets were performed in palace
halls or gardens, there were no elevated stages or proscenium arches, and the audience
occupied  seats  arranged  in  tiers  and  viewed  the  spectacle  from  above  (Cohen  &
Matheson 1992; Homans 2010). This positioning of dancers in relation to the audience
afforded geometric patterns of dancers’ displacement in the performance space (see
figure 5):
[T]he ballets were performed, not on raised stages, but in the central space of large
halls with the audience seated above the floor in galleries that extended around
three sides of the dancing area. The wise masters reasoned out that the way to
dazzle was not with steps,  which the performers could not do expertly and the
audience could not see well, but with floor patterns – complex geometrical shapes
that formed, dissolved, and reformed to display a tantalizing variety of designs.
(Cohen & Matheson 1992: 7)
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Figure 5: A 1721 dance as represented in the Beauchamp-Feuillet notation. The notation system
itself stressed the geometrical character of the dancers’ displacement as viewed from above. 
[upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1e/Feuillet_notation.jpg].
The historical development of classical ballet saw a transition from these performance
spaces to proscenium arch stages as we typically know them. That corresponded to a
change  in  the  relation  between  dancers  and  audiences.  The  architecture  of  the
proscenium arch stage offers  a  different  set  of  initiating conditions for  sign action
incorporated in the performance space, as it locates the performance in front of the
audience and frames it  with the proscenium arch.  The development of this kind of
stage was  directly  influenced by visual  perspective  (see  Breton 1990;  Barker  & Bay
2016), a technique developed by Filippo Brunelleschi and Leon Battista Alberti in the
context  of  architectural  drawing  and  painting.  The  stage  functions  as  a  one-point
perspective box that privileges frontality of observation. 
Regardless  of  wider  historical  or  contextual  considerations,  the  frontality  of
observation afforded by the cognitive artifact of the proscenium arch stage already
imposes new initiating conditions for sign action. However, when we consider actual
semiosis,  this  set  of  initiating conditions  are  always  acting together  with a  macro-
semiotic level, subjected to a regulatory process that involves a network of semiotic
chains.  When we consider  the  proscenium arch stage in  ballet,  a  relevant  semiotic
chain concerns the construction of  the body of  the dancer as a sign endowed with
meaning.  This  extensive  semiotic  chain  includes,  among others,  the  contrapposto of
Classical  Antiquity  statuary,  the  Renaissance  aesthetic  ideal  of  mathematically
harmonious body proportions,  the Pythagorean academic association between body,
music and mathematics in 16th century France (Homans 2010: 5), the severe discipline
of body movements established by the etiquette of the French court, the posture and
footwork  of  fencing.  This  historical  regulation  had  before  determined  the
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geometrically-precise body of the baroque dancer as the dancing body performing in
the halls and gardens for an audience of nobles and courtiers. The introduction of the
proscenium arch stage and its new set of initiating conditions was followed by new
retranslations  of  the  ballet  dancer  as  a  sign.  In  the  eighteenth  century,  the  ballet
master creator of the ballet d’action, Jean George Noverre, likened the perspective box of
the proscenium arch stage to the tableaux of a painting, and put forward a conception
of  ballet  as  a  dynamic  painting.  Noverre  emphasized  pictorial  composition  and
narrative,  chiaroscuro, and  perspective,  suggesting  that  dancers  be  assigned  roles
according to their stature so as to emphasize the perspectival illusion of depth, and
introducing  pauses  in  the  ballet  action  so  that  the  audience  could  take  time  to
appreciate the details of the visual compositions of his balletic tableaux (Monteiro 1998,
ch. 2; Homans 2010: 74). The intersemiotic relation (relation between different semiotic
systems)  with painting regulated how the frontality  of  observation afforded by the
proscenium arch stage theater acted semiotically in the ballet d’action. The frontality of
observation afforded by the proscenium arch stage also provides initiating conditions
for the romantic revolution that marks the start of modern ballets (see Homans 2010:
170).  Romantic  ballet  was  decisively dependent  on  vertical  morphologies  of  dance
movement.  The  influential  dancer  Marie  Taglioni,  the  first  romantic  ballerina,
stabilized into a balletic habit the en pointe technique (dancing on the tip of the toes),
helping to form the ideal image of the ballerina as an ethereal and weightless figure.
This verticality of dance went together with Romanticist aesthetic ideals. In fact, as
indicated  by  Homans,  Taglioni’s  career  represents  a  central  point  of  connection
between ballet and French literary Romanticism: 
Robert le Diable [1831 opera including a ballet performed by Taglioni] opened ballet
to the world of literary Romanticism. In the years to come, a generation of poets,
writers,  and  artists  found  themselves  drawn  to  Taglioni  and  to  dance.  Heine,
Stendhal,  Balzac,  Théophile  Gautier,  and Jules  Janin  all  wrote  about  ballet.  The
poems  and  stories  of  Sir  Walter  Scott  and  E. T. A. Hoffmann,  Victor  Hugo  and
Charles Nodier, served as inspiration for ballet masters, and both Heine and Gautier
wrote ballet librettos of their own. Perhaps most important of all, and building on
Noverre, these poets and writers understood that ballet was not merely an aspect of
opera but had a distinct language of its own: they were its first informed critics. Nor
was their role merely responsive or passive, for their writings defined Taglioni’s
image and played a critical role in promoting her career. (Ibid.: 150-1)
Both Noverre’s pictoric ballet and the verticality of dance of the romantic ballerina are
retranslations of the body of the ballet dancer as a sign. They presuppose the frontality
of observation afforded by the proscenium arch stage, and submit it to the regulatory
influence of past sign action (perspective in painting in the case of Noverre, literary
Romanticism  in  the  case  of  Taglioni).  These  operations  create  novel  processes  of
meaning, emergent episodes of sign action.
 
Conclusion
In classical examples of distributed cognition, sign action is distributed within spatial
contexts:  boats  (Hutchins  1995a),  cockpit  of  an  airplane  (Hutchins  1995b),  research
laboratory (Nersessian et al. 2003), theater building (Tribble 2005). In these examples,
the  distribution  of  cognition  is  decisively  conceived  as  a  matter  of  spatial  locus:
cognition is not only located in the head of individuals, but in spatial environments of
cognitive artifacts and cultural practices. In our approach, the focus of description of
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distributed sign action is not spatial, but temporal. It is not only the case that a sign
cannot simply be described as spatially contained within one’s skull, it is also (and more
centrally) the case that a sign cannot be described as temporally contained within one
event  or  episode.  Even when the  focus  of  observation is  effective  instantiated sign
action in a single event, the sign acts as a temporally distributed process in which a
regular tendency towards certain future outcomes emerges out of  a history of  sign
interactions. 
Our most fundamental explanatory unit is sign action, a temporally distributed process.
This is what grounds our emergentist account of cognition. Semiosis self-organizes in
time, in a process that continuously entails the production of more signs. Emergence is
a ubiquitous condition in this process:  the translation of signs into signs cannot be
inferred from the properties of the components of a semiotic triad alone, but has to
take into account a complex interaction between a micro-semiotic and macro-semiotic
level of description. This interaction can be understood as an interplay of potentialities
and  tendencies,  or  upward  constitutive  determinative  relations  and  downward
selective  determinative  relations.  According  to  this  view,  emergence  is  a  central
defining condition of processes of meaning. The emergence of sign action is associated
with novelty, creativity, and surprise in cultural evolution. 
Ballet is a sign in action. It is a unique process of meaning that continues to emerge in
time  through  the  interplay  of  material  situated  conditions  afforded  by  cognitive
artifacts  at  a  given moment  and habits  of  sign  action  within  networks  of  semiotic
chains. This process has emerged as a relation of meaning involving different kinds of
cognitive artifacts: musical, bodily/motor, visual and pictoric, spatial and architectonic,
etc.  Before the emergence,  these cognitive artifacts  developed according to  various
semiotic  habits:  e.g.,  etiquette and  fencing  regulated  body  discipline,  perspective
regulated the architectonic space of theatre stages and the pictoric space of the canvas.
In classical  ballet,  a novel and unique habit  emerges that regulates the behavior of
several cognitive artifacts. One case is the development of the verticality of dance in
classical ballet as a semiotic relation connecting proscenium arch stages and dancers as
temporally  distributed signs.  This  development is  micro-semiotically  determined by
the  spatial  conditions  of  the  proscenium  arch  stage,  and  macro-semiotically
determined by a historical construction of the body of the dancer within a network of
semiotic  chains,  such  as  the  body  of  the  dancer  as  a  pictoric  object  in  a  painting
tableaux organized by  one-point  perspective,  or  as  an  embodiment  of  the  aesthetic
ideals of literary Romanticism. This is not only the emergence of actual meaning, but
also the emergence of an open-ended field of potential and general meanings, a self-
organized and temporally-distributed semiotic process.
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NOTES
1. We follow the practice of citing from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce
1931-35, 1958) by volume number and paragraph number, preceded by CP; the Essential Peirce,
by volume number and page number, preceded by EP. References to the Annotated Catalogue of
the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (1967) will be indicated by MS, followed by the manuscript number
and pages.
2. Peirce’s semiotics is oriented by a philosophical principle of continuity, which Peirce refers to
by the neologism “synechism.” Synechism is a “tendency to regard everything as continuous”
(CP  7.565).  According  to  Peirce  (CP  6.169),  synechism is  “[…]  that  tendency  of  philosophical
thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy and, in
particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity […].” Synechism is first
and foremost a methodological principle, “a maxim to look for connections and continuous strata
between seemingly disconnected entities or events” (Esposito 2005, Introduction, par. 1).  This
principle  of  continuity  abhors  substantial  dualism  –  the  notion  that  psychical  and  physical
phenomena are two completely separated categories of being – which Peirce refers to as “the
philosophy which performs its analyses with an axe, leaving, as the ultimate elements, unrelated
chunks of being” (Peirce 1893/1998, EP 2:2). Although Peirce construes his principle of continuity
as a methodological principle, it points to a metaphysical hypothesis: “On the metaphysical side
synechism is a hypothetical description of a tightly woven universe, a universe woven not within
Emergent Sign-Action
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
18
layers  of  the  same  kind  of  reality  but  between  layers  in  a  scalar  fashion.”  (Esposito  2005,
Introduction, par. 1).
ABSTRACTS
We explore Peirce’s pragmatic conception of sign action, as a distributed and emergent view of
cognition and exemplify with the emergence of classical ballet. In our approach, semiosis is a
temporally distributed process in which a regular tendency towards certain future outcomes
emerges  out  of  a  history  of  sign  actions.  Semiosis  self-organizes  in  time,  in  a  process  that
continuously entails the production of more signs. Emergence is a ubiquitous condition in this
process:  the  translation  of  signs  into  signs  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  properties  of  the
components of a semiotic triad alone, but has to take into account a complex interaction between
a micro-semiotic and macro-semiotic level of description. This interaction can be understood as
an interplay of potentialities and tendencies, or upward constitutive determinative relations and
downward  selective  determinative  relations.  According  to  this  view,  emergence  is  a  central
defining condition of processes of meaning.
Ballet is a sign in action. The emergence of classical ballet is a self-regulatory process, in which a
system of different kinds of cognitive artifacts (musical, bodily/motor, spatial/architectonic) and
agents obtained a stable semiotic relation throughout many phases of development between the
16th and the 19th Century. One case is the development of the verticality of dance in classical
ballet as a semiotic relation connecting proscenium arch stages, dancing bodies, and audiences.
This development is micro-semiotically determined by the spatial constraints of the proscenium
arch stage, and macro-semiotically determined by a historical construction of the dancing body
as a sign within a network of semiotic chains, such as the intersemiotic regulation of body of the
dancer by principles coming from painting. This is not only the emergence of actual meaning,
but also the emergence of an open-ended field of potential and general meanings, an autonomous
tendency of development. To say that ballet,  as sign action, emerges, is to say that cognitive
artifacts  such as  dancer’s  bodies,  stages  and audience’s  point  of  view,  musical  compositions,
costumes, all sorts of supporting institutions, etc, constitute a niche for sign action, interacting
according to tendencies of development that didn’t exist before.
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